Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR CongoS/2002/1146
Letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to refer to the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39), whereby the Security Council renewed for a period of six months the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council requested the Panel to submit to it an interim report after three months, followed by a final report at the end of its mandate. I refer also to the letter dated 12 July 2002 from the President (S/2002/763), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel until 31 October 2002.
I have the honour to transmit to you the final report of the Panel, which was submitted to me by its Chairman, Mr. Mahmoud Kassem. This independent report comprises an evaluation of the situation on the ground and the Panel's observations on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Annex. Letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Chairman of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Secretary-General
[Original: English]
In accordance with the statement of the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2001/39) dated 19 December 2001 and the letter dated 12 July 2002 addressed to you by the President of the Council, the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is pleased to submit its report for transmission to the President of the Security Council.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem
Chairman
Panel of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(...)
IV. Rwanda-controlled area
65. The claims of Rwanda concerning its security have justified the continuing presence of its armed forces, whose real long-term purpose is, to use the term employed by the Congo Desk of the Rwandan Patriotic Army, to "secure property". Rwanda's leaders have succeeded in persuading the international community that their military presence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo protects the country against hostile groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who, they claim, are actively mounting an invasion against them.
66. The Panel has extensive evidence to the contrary. For example, the Panel is in possession of a letter, dated 26 May 2000, from Jean-Pierre Ondekane, First Vice-President and Chief of the Military High Command for RCD-Goma, urging all army units to maintain good relations "with our Interahamwe and Mayi-Mayi brothers", and further, "if necessary to let them exploit the sub-soil for their survival".
67. Prominent members of a Congolese Hutu group, Benemugabohumwe, recently began to encourage Hutus living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, some of them opposition groups, to work instead for the cause of Rwanda in the country. Eugene Serufuli, RCD-Goma Governor of North Kivu Province and reportedly himself a Hutu, has promoted a non-governmental organization, Tous pour la paix et la démocratie, aiming to conscript Hutus of all political persuasions to throw in their lot with the Rwandans. Their purpose, as described by the Nord Kivu Reveil in a circular dated 16 April 2002, has been to "express allegiance to Rwanda by joining its efforts to control the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo".
68. A 30-year-old Interahamwe combatant living in the area of Bukavu described the situation in a taped interview with a United Nations officer in early 2002.
We haven't fought much with the RPA in the last two years. We think they are tired of this war, like we are. In any case, they aren't here in the Congo to chase us, like they pretend. I have seen the gold and coltan mining they do here, we see how they rob the population. These are the reasons for their being here. The RPA come and shoot in the air and raid the villagers' houses but they don't attack us any more. If you are lucky, and you have a big brother in the RPA, he might be able to get you some food and ammunition.
69. On the basis of its analysis of considerable documentation and oral testimony, the Panel holds the view that the rationale for Rwanda's presence is to increase the numbers of Rwandans in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and to encourage those settled there to act in unison to support its exercise of economic control. The recent departure of troops should not be interpreted as a sign of Rwanda's willingness to reduce its considerable involvement in the evacuation of valuable resources, to reduce the level of armed conflict or to diminish the humanitarian crisis in the region. Economic exploitation in its various forms will continue, relying on a less conspicuous armed force and alternative strategies for carrying out the exploitative activities.
The elite network
70. The elite network's operations in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo are managed centrally from the RPA Congo Desk, which serves to link the commercial and military activities of RPA. The Panel has described this function in some detail in previous reports. The Panel continues to receive documentation on ways in which the proceeds of the RPA commercial wing finance an armed presence. As an illustration, the Panel has recently acquired documents showing coltan sales being negotiated by ranking Congo Desk officials. The Panel has copies of faxes sent from the office of RPA Major Dan Munyuza on behalf of Maniema Mining Company and another fax sent from the office of RPA Chief of Staff General James Kaberebe.
71. While revenues and expenditure in the Congo Desk are considerable, they are kept strictly separate from Rwanda's national budget. A reliable source associated with the Congo Desk has calculated that income to the Desk provided 80 per cent of all RPA expenditure in 1999. The official Rwandan budget for 1999 allocated $80 million to the military. If this official budget allocation of $80 million represents the 20 per cent referred to by the Panel's source as the portion of military expenditure not covered by the Congo Desk, then the total military budget from all sources would approximate $400 million. This comes to 20 per cent of GNP for 1999 and approximately 150 per cent of recurring budget expenditure for that year. The Congo Desk's contribution to Rwanda's military expenses would therefore have been in the order of $320 million. The activities funded by revenues generated by the Congo Desk strongly shape Rwanda's foreign policy and directly influence national decision-making in a number of domains. These transactions are, however, hidden from the scrutiny of international organizations.
72. The elite network maintains close commercial ties with transnational criminal networks, including those of Victor Bout, Sanjivan Ruprah and Richard Muamba Nozi. Victor Bout's aircraft are utilized for a number of purposes including transport of coltan and cassiterite, the transport of supplies into mining sites, and the transport of military troops and equipment. During the last major military campaign in Pweto, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Victor Bout's aircraft were used to transport RPA personnel to the area.
73. While Sanjivan Ruprah has frequently worked within Victor Bout's criminal organization, he maintains an independent affiliation with the Congo Desk in Kigali. On 7 February 2002, Mr. Ruprah was arrested in Belgium on suspicion of planning to provide 6 million new zaire banknotes - still valid in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo - to RCD-Goma with financing by diamond dealers based in Belgium. The President of RCD-Goma, Adolphe Onusumba, who has kinship and business ties with Mr. Ruprah, played a key role in this counterfeit operation. Another group, the Muamba Nozi counterfeiting operation, also provides counterfeit Congolese francs to RCD-Goma. Its regional base of operations is located at Nairobi, where they print and distribute to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo large quantities of counterfeit Congolese francs. Officials in the Central Bank of Kinshasa have informed the Panel that Mr. Muamba Nozi's counterfeit activities are politically motivated and designed to deliberately destabilize the present regime by weakening the currency.
Strategies and sources of revenue
Coltan
74. The end of the SOMIGL coltan monopoly in April 2001 was less a consequence of the falling price of coltan and more a consequence of Rwanda's determination to capture more of the revenue that was being taken in taxes by the RCD-Goma rebel administration. The termination of the agreement with SOMIGL made it possible for RPA to frustrate the efforts of RCD-Goma to raise revenue for its own purposes.
75. The bulk of coltan exported from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as much as 60 to 70 per cent, has been mined under the direct surveillance of RPA mining détachés and evacuated by aircraft from airstrips near mining sites directly to Kigali or Cyangugu. No taxes are paid. Rwandan military aircraft, Victor Bout's aircraft and small airline companies are used in the evacuation of the coltan. RPA has maintained control over most of the coltan sites where rich deposits are found, where the percentage of tantalum is high, and where local airstrips are accessible. A variety of forced labour regimes are found at sites that have been managed by RPA mining détachés, some for coltan collection, some for transport, others for domestic services. Many accounts report the widespread use of prisoners imported from Rwanda who work as indentured labour.
76. A smaller portion, perhaps 15 to 25 per cent of the total coltan exported, is purchased by comptoirs owned by Rwandans who buy from local négotiants at remote coltan sites or from the agents of local defence groups. More typically these comptoirs, owned by Rwandan army officers or those closely linked to the Government of Rwanda, such as MHI comptoir, Eagle Wings or Rwanda Metals, have obtained their own mining sites and conscript their own workers to exploit the sites under severe conditions.
77. The smallest portion of coltan is purchased by the few remaining Congolese-owned comptoirs at one of the large number of coltan sites in remote areas. Most of the Congolese comptoirs have found it impossible to compete with the RPA or Rwanda-owned comptoirs.
78. As mining profits to the Congo Desk have increased, the share of RCD-Goma has declined. The Congo Desk has perennially deprived its junior partner, RCD-Goma, of any significant share in resources and prerogatives, and RCD-Goma has perennially complained. RCD-Goma administrators have frequently pointed out that they were unable to manage their army without sufficient revenue. Lacking financial support, the ANC brigades have turned to pillaging villagers throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The third Brigade has stolen a large number of cattle around Kalemie, and the first Brigade has taken diamonds from Opala. The Panel possesses extensive documentation on these activities. Most of these rebel forces are under the command of RPA officers. They have little hesitation, when so directed, in attacking local self-defence groups who obstruct their commercial operations, to eliminate specific enemies, to provide security around gold, coltan and diamond rich areas, to provide police services in urban areas and occasionally to keep a force present along the front lines. Since ANC troops are neither paid nor disciplined, they use their weapons to prey on the population, frequently burning whole villages to acquire property and food.
Case study of a commercial chain involving coltan
79. Eagle Wings Resources International, a coltan comptoir in Bukavu, is a subsidiary of Trinitech International Inc., based in Ohio, United States. Eagle Wings has offices in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The manager of Eagle Wings in Kigali has close ties to the Rwandan regime. Consequently, Eagle Wings operates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a Rwanda-controlled comptoir with all the privileges derived from this connection. Eagle Wings is not obliged to fulfil its full responsibilities to the public treasury managed by the RCD-Goma administration. Like other Rwanda-controlled coltan comptoirs, Eagle Wings collaborates with RPA to receive privileged access to coltan sites and captive labour.
80. Approximately 25 per cent of Eagle Wings coltan is shipped from Kigali to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant of NAC Kazatomprom, in Kazakhstan. Another 25 per cent is sold to the parent company of Eagle Wings, Trinitech International Inc. in the United States, which arranges for sales to both Ulba and to the Chinese processing facility at Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metals Smeltery (NNMS). H. C. Starck, based in Germany and a subsidiary of the transnational corporation Bayer AG, purchases about 15 per cent of Eagle Wings coltan. H. C. Starck has denied on numerous occasions obtaining coltan originating from Central Africa. In a press statement issued on 24 May 2002, H. C. Starck reiterated that the company had purchased no material originating in Central Africa since August 2001. The Panel possesses documents showing the contrary. In the same press release, H. C. Starck claimed that its coltan originates from "peasant suppliers" and not from rebel groups. In fact, no coltan exits from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo without benefiting either the rebel group or foreign armies.
81. In one instance on which the Panel has documentation, Mozambique Gemstone Company provided false documents establishing Mozambique as the origin of a shipment of coltan originating in Rwanda and transiting through South Africa. Mozambique Gemstone Company then sold the consignment to AMC African Trading and Consulting Company Ltd., based in South Africa, which subsequently sold the consignment to H. C. Starck Ltd. in Rayong, Thailand, on 21 September 2001. H. C. Starck sent a letter of credit for this consignment on 9 May 2002 to Chemie Pharmacie Holland, which oversaw the transaction, and which is a commercial partner of Eagle Wings providing logistical and financial services. Eagle Wings is the only coltan source for Chemie Pharmacie. Eagle Wings has no operations in Mozambique.
82. The Panel has also had direct contacts with the Chinese processing facility, NNMS, to determine whether they use coltan originating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. NNMS categorically denied doing business with "any individual or any entity that represents somebody or some entity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." In fact, a number of brokers trading in coltan originating from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have informed the Panel of their sales to NNMS. A publicity presentation prepared by NNMS itself has stated that the reason that they are able to provide low prices for their output is that NNMS buys significant amounts of cheap raw material from Central Africa. One NNMS report notes that 50 per cent of all coltan purchased for processing originates in Central Africa. Frequent follow-up Panel enquiries with NNMS were ignored.
Diamonds
83. The diamond market was the prize Rwanda fought Uganda to have for its own. After the last clash in Kisangani in June 2000, RPA worked through the RCD-Goma administration to funnel all the diamonds in Kisangani through the Congo Desk control. The technique was to oblige all local diamond traders to sell to one principal comptoir holding exclusive export rights.
84. The Congo Desk gave Aziz Nassour the first monopoly. Aziz Nassour fell out of favour with the Congo Desk and was replaced by an Israeli diamond dealer, Philippe Surowicz. Diamond traders in Kisangani remember the Surowicz period as a "reign of terror". Diamond sellers frequently reported entering "Monsieur Philippe's" comptoir only to be confronted with RPA military who named a derisory price and took the diamonds. The Congo Desk replaced Mr. Surowicz in October 2001 with a Lebanese, Hamad Khalil, who worked through the Bakayoko comptoir in Kisangani.
85. In mid-November 2001, the Department of Lands, Mines and Energy of RCD-Goma conducted a study of Hamad Khalil's performance in the first month of his tenure. His quota had been set at a minimum of $500,000 per month. Mr. Khalil met his quota exporting diamonds valued at $576,380 over a period of 27 days. The performance was adequate, but it was far below the Kisangani sales potential of up to $2 million per month. His poor performance raised the suspicion that the Congo Desk was using Mr. Khalil to divert revenues that might otherwise accrue to the RCD-Goma administration. A similar inspection of diamond production in the Sankuru and Lodja areas of Northern Kasai the week before had also revealed that RPA officers were clandestinely taking large quantities of diamonds out of Northern Kasai directly to the Congo Desk in Kigali. RCD-Goma determined that Mr. Khalil was undervaluing the diamonds, and the consequence was a reduction in taxes payable to RCD-Goma's public treasury as well as a greater margin of profit for Mr. Khalil and the Congo Desk. The study concludes that "The public treasury would have four times the present revenue from diamonds were it not for fraudulent practices and the under-valuation of diamonds".
Imports, taxation and requisition by the public sector
86. The controversial "conflict" diamonds from Kisangani are marketed by criminal networks. Proceeds from these criminal sales are laundered by the purchase of large quantities of household goods in Dubai - sugar, soap, cloth and medicines - which are then imported to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and offered to local sellers at attractive prices. The Rwandan wholesalers use the profits in Congolese francs to buy dollars and, to close the trade circuit, to purchase diamonds.
87. The interest of the RPA commercial wing in selling consumables at attractive prices is not only to launder money from criminal diamond sales, but also to place the once-thriving Kisangani economy under Rwanda's control. The cloths that were once manufactured at the Kisangani Sotexki factory and renowned for their quality no longer compete with the cheaper imports, and the result is that the Sotexki labour force, once 2,000, now stands at 100. The palm oil once produced locally at the Unilever-owned plant can no longer compete with the imported oil that is sold in Kisangani at a third of the price of locally produced oil. The Unilever-owned palm oil plants in Kisangani are practically at a standstill. Weakening local production not only undermines the local manufacturing economy and makes the Kisangani population captive consumers, it also shifts Kisangani's manufacturing economy to Kigali.
88. Another strategy for raising revenue is to use RCD-Goma's public sector facade to requisition funds from public enterprises. On 21 November 2001, the Secretary General of RCD-Goma requisitioned by decree all revenues generated by public utilities and parastatals. On the following day the Secretary General annulled all existing collective agreements for workers in those enterprises. The decrees were applicable to all public enterprises, including the water utility, the airport authorities, the electricity utility, the road and transport authority among others. RCD-Goma declared the requisitions to be in the public interest. Within a month, the water utility lacked sufficient funds to purchase water purification chemicals in Kisangani and Bukavu and power stations stopped functioning for lack of necessary repairs. The International Committee of the Red Cross has stepped in to provide 60 tons of chemicals for water purification and has financed costly repairs at Tshopo power station to avert a discontinuation of water supply in Kisangani and avert a cholera outbreak. The parastatal transport company ceased to function, and the airport authorities appealed to RCD-Goma to restore a portion of the requisitioned funds since no salaries had been paid for six months.
89. Following a decree on 15 March 2002, new taxes were introduced and all existing tax rates have been increased. Over an 18-month period, since the previous tax decree of September 2000, taxes on electrical consumption have increased by 200 per cent. Licences for trading in agricultural products increased fourfold. Most licensing fees for operating a business were doubled or tripled. The number of different taxes collected in the area under RCD-Goma administration has increased four times since 1998. None of the tax revenue is used to provide public services.
Armed conflict and its consequences
90. Medical practitioners, church workers, and non-governmental organizations in northern Katanga all attest to rapidly escalating disorder in Kalemie and an increased use of arms by a wide range of groups, some affiliated with RCD-Goma and others not. Fighting between RPA and FAC has been limited to Rwanda's seizure of northern Katanga in November 1998 and a government counter-offensive in October 2000. These confrontations resulted in considerable displacement of populations in the path of troop movements. However, it was the aftermath of those confrontations that resulted in the most severe armed conflict. Rwandan troops seized material for their campaigns. The RCD-Goma third ANC Brigade, following Rwanda's example in their own random fashion, seized food and other property. Armed movements arose among local populations for self-defence, and occasionally these local militias banded together with other local militias to create larger armed groups. The Panel has received extensive documentation from local lawyers, Catholic and Protestant churches, the Fédération des Entreprises au Congo and others detailing thefts of cattle valued at more than $15 million, thefts of over $1 million worth of retail goods and the destruction or fraudulent sale of equipment from the Société nationale de chemin de fer du Congo.
91. The Catholic Church in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has spoken out boldly about the thefts, killings, torture, extortions, rapes and piracy on Lake Tanganyika perpetrated originally by RPA and continued by ANC, the RCD-Goma police and the Banyamulenge militia. The Church, and most notably the Bishop of Kalemie-Kirungu, recently headed a campaign to expose these abuses. Directors of RCD-Goma's Department of Security and Information responded by threatening to kill prominent church leaders. The Catholic Diocese published a list of those threats on 15 May 2002.
92. The multiplication of armed forces and fighting in the interior have all but destroyed farm production on the rich plateau in the interior of northern Katanga. Excesses by RPA in requisitioning resources for the "war effort" set a standard for behaviour by the far less disciplined ANC rebel forces, who have ravaged the countryside. Growers are reluctant to invest in crops when they are so likely to be stolen. Large numbers of persons have been displaced from their homes and have abandoned their lands out of fear. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has estimated that, in the northern Katanga area alone, 350,000 displaced persons are living away from their homes, with neighbours, in the cities or in the bush.
93. Armed conflict along the Masisi-Walikale-Goma axis arises from tensions between the large numbers of RPA in place to manage mining operations and Hutus who may be resident, but who are also imported or conscripted by Rwandan forces to carry out mining under forced labour conditions. Separate Rwanda-owned comptoirs have quarrelled among themselves for access to sites. RPA forces have attacked and burned villages to seize coltan mined by some Hutu groups or local villagers. The Panel has taken testimony from villagers who have been forced to leave their villages following attacks. With minor exceptions, the objective of military activity is to secure access to mining sites or ensure a supply of captive labour.
94. Population displacement is the outcome of frequent armed conflict, with the predictable consequences of food insecurity, malnutrition and high mortality rates for both the displaced and host populations. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 1.5 million persons were displaced in March 2001 in the areas occupied by Rwanda in North and South Kivu, Maniema and Katanga, nearly 14 per cent of the population. More than three quarters of families living in the rural areas have probably been forced to move at least once in the last five years. This degree of armed conflict undermines local authority and encourages an abusive social environment. Public infrastructure is destroyed. School enrolment in Shabunda has dropped 56 per cent since 1998. Men are led to abuse women on a surprising scale throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. International non-governmental organizations have provided comprehensive reports about groups of women being taken hostage and submitted to long periods of sexual abuse. Children become instruments of war, forced to work in the mines and conscripted into armed forces. United Nations officials have suggested that the number of child soldiers in the rebel armies is much higher than reported by the rebel administrations, and that 50 per cent of local defence and Mayi-Mayi groups are children.
Malnutrition and mortality
95. Malnutrition studies carried out by non-governmental organizations in both northern Katanga and the Kivus have shown that, in some places, as many as 25 to 30 per cent of all children under 5 years are malnourished. In most cases, this is due to the large numbers of displaced persons who have been forced to leave their own agricultural production and have taken refuge in nearby host villages. A number of studies have shown the close link between elevated malnutrition levels and mortality rates in this region.
96. The most commonly quoted conclusion from the International Rescue Committee's surveys is that 2.5 million more people died since the beginning of the war than would have died had the war not occurred. While the study is directly relevant to the sample population of 1.3 million, the International Rescue Committee has assumed that conditions are sufficiently similar throughout all five provinces of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to justify applying the mortality rates found in the sampled population to the larger population in all five provinces. The study covered the period from August 1998 to April 2001. If one assumes mortality to have continued at the same rate, this would mean that more than 3.5 million excess deaths would have occurred from the beginning of the war up to September 2002. These deaths are a direct result of the occupation by Rwanda and Uganda. Extensive mortality, especially mortality among children, is the consequence of a cycle of aggression, the multiplication of armed forces, a high frequency of conflict and its consequences, especially displacement. One should not be surprised to find, in areas most affected by the conflict, a mortality rate for children under 5 years of 35 per cent.
V. Uganda-controlled area
See http://groups.yahoo.com/group/uRwanda_rwacu/message/288
VIII. Observations
149. The illegal exploitation of natural resources, gross violations of human rights and a dire humanitarian situation are some of the consequences of four years of war and the lack of a central government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the authority and capacity to protect its citizens and resources.
150. The withdrawal of foreign forces is an important step towards ending the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Yet the necessary networks have already become deeply embedded to ensure that the illegal exploitation continues, independent of the physical presence of the foreign armies.
151. Another step towards halting the exploitation of natural resources will be the early establishment of an all-inclusive transitional government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which would ensure that central government control is reinstated and that viable local administrations are empowered to protect and regulate the exploitation activities to the benefit of the populace. However, it is clear that, even with the establishment of an all-inclusive government, exercising effective control over territory and natural resources would require time and would be possible only within the context of a broader framework of sound institution-building. In the interim, it is the view of the Panel that continued monitoring and reporting on the illegal exploitation of resources will at least serve to deter these activities.
152. The most important element in effectively halting the illegal exploitation of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo relates to the political will of those who support, protect and benefit from the networks. This may pose a great challenge, given the intricate relationships they have forged and the dependency they have developed on the profits from these activities. The war economy controlled by the three elite networks operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo dominates the economic activities of much of the Great Lakes region. Yet the Lusaka, Pretoria and Luanda Agreements do not address this all-important economic component of the conflict.
153. Armed groups, whether foreign or Congolese, who are benefiting from these exploitation activities, should also be taken into account in efforts to halt the exploitation. Years of lawlessness and a Government incapable of protecting its citizens have allowed the armed groups to loot and plunder the country's resources with impunity. While some hide behind a political agenda, all are pursuing illegal economic activities as a matter of survival. It is hoped that progress in the peace process, together with an effective and responsive programme of disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and resettlement, would provide better alternatives to the armed groups. This would require the necessary funding for reintegration programmes and security assurances for those who are not wanted for war crimes or acts of genocide. The international community must, therefore, provide the assistance to these programmes, invest in publicizing them and encourage the armed groups to participate.
154. The Panel is hoping that this report will contribute to a shift in policies - in the light of the recent encouraging political and military developments on the ground - that will bring the exploitation of resources back to a legally acceptable level.
IX. Conclusions
155. An embargo or a moratorium banning the export of raw materials originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo does not seem to be a viable means of helping to improve the situation of the country's Government, citizens or natural environment. Massive technical and financial assistance for the population would be required to offset the humanitarian impact of such restrictive measures. At the same time, if the Panel in its report does not recommend any punitive measures to curb the illegal exploitation and trade originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this will only encourage a continuation of the exploitation by different criminal organizations. This could easily lead to an increase in these activities. There must be sustained efforts to deter illicit and illegal exploitation.
156. Restrictive measures nevertheless need to be taken vis-à-vis the role of companies and individuals involved in arms supply and resource plundering. The international and multinational dimension of these illegal activities is very important. Ethical and transparent business practices are needed to combat these illegal activities.
157. The establishment of a transitional government in Kinshasa should be accompanied by four elements, namely, the disarmament of all rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; phased withdrawal of foreign troops; measures to drastically curb the illegal exploitation and encourage legal exploitation; and the application of serious leverage through multilateral pressures and incentives. To these elements must be added a dynamic monitoring process. All must be phased, interlinked and ongoing. This dynamic package would not only advance the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but would also lead to a peaceful and final settlement of the exploitation issue, ensuring that legal modes of resource exploitation prevail. The first two elements seem to be finding their way to an interlinked and phased implementation as a result of the recent agreements signed in Pretoria and Luanda. The third element is intrinsically linked with the fourth, namely applying leverage through incentives and disincentives.
158. In order to readjust the present process of illegal exploitation and encourage legal exploitation, which could contribute to the economic stability of all parties, there is a need to apply forceful disincentives and incentives. These should be monitored through a proactive monitoring body. Until now, all the parties involved in the illegal exploitation have had no strong incentive to alter the economic status quo. It is necessary, therefore, to find measures that address their fears of losing revenues. Such measures will however be effective only if a political process is undertaken simultaneously.
159. Reconstructing and reorienting the region's economies are essential to peacemaking and peace-building. The Panel believes that a peace dividend in the form of economic incentives should be emphasized by the international community in order to promote the parties' adherence to the peace agreements and encourage confidence-building. The Panel also proposes in its recommendations that a set of disincentives be enacted to apply pressure in the case of non-compliance with the agreements.
160. Many of the Panel's conclusions about the economic roots and consequences of the conflict have been echoed in ideas associated with the proposals for an international conference on peace, security, democracy and sustainable development in the Great Lakes region. Recently signed agreements may signal that the time for organizing this conference is approaching. Such a conference would be an ideal forum to address the need to reorient the regional trading system to post-conflict imperatives and for negotiating the framework of a multilateral agreement to carry this out. This reorientation will require providing the incentives and means to promote regional economic integration, which would marginalize criminal and military-driven trade in favour of legitimate commercial development that is transparent and growth-oriented. Supporting regional economic integration could help to gradually draw the countries involved in the conflict closer and act as a barrier to future outbreaks of armed conflict.
X. Recommendations
Peace dividend
161. In the light of the new dynamic and progress created by the signing of the political and military agreements in Sun City, Pretoria and Luanda, the Panel believes that a set of agreements or initiatives on reconstruction and sustainable development are needed to address the economic dimension of the Lusaka peace process and provide incentives for continuing progress. The first set of initiatives could be for quick-disbursing aid for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other Great Lakes countries involved in the conflict, for reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes, aimed at creating jobs, rebuilding infrastructure and improving conditions for local populations, notably in the areas of education, health, water and sanitation.
162. Regional economic integration and trade could be the focus of an agreement or set of agreements that could emerge from discussions regionally, including at the international conference on peace, security and sustainable development. The international community, in particular the United Nations and the developed countries that have actively supported the signing of the recent agreements, can take a leading role in convening this conference.
Institutional reforms
Capacity-building for the State institutions
163. Reconstructing and reforming the State institutions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly the State's capacity to secure its territory and borders, is the counterpoint to the withdrawal of the foreign troops. The main purpose should be to enable the legitimate transitional government to control the country's natural resources and borders without foreign intervention.
164. A fast-track programme is needed to retrain and professionalize the entire national security apparatus, including military and intelligence, law enforcement and regulatory bodies, such as customs, revenue authority, immigration and natural resources agencies. This process will require extensive international aid and careful monitoring of progress over a sustained period. There is a need for multilateral and bilateral donors, together with international organizations, to coordinate their efforts, draw on best practices developed during other post-conflict transitions and encourage the participation of all sectors of Congolese society.
165. The priority areas for reform and the strengthening of national or central institutions would include:
- Combating the widespread criminalization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Enhancing scrutiny and transparency
- Increasing accountability and ending the impunity enjoyed by high-ranking officials and various levels of civil servants
- Building regulatory capacity and controls
- Professionalizing institutions and their personnel, including ensuring their independence and neutrality
- Reforming customs and revenue administrations, such as the Office des douanes et accises and the Direction générale des recettes administratives, judiciaires, domaniales et de participations
- Building the capacity of ministries and specialized agencies related to natural resources such as the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification des matières précieuses and the Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature.
Promoting legitimate and accountable civil administrations in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
166. The Panel recommends that a comprehensive economic and social development programme in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo be set up to assist a transition to a legitimate civilian administration with a capable security and law-enforcement apparatus. Such a programme may be partially financed from the substantial assistance commitments pledged by the European Union, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for post-conflict reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Good governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its compliance with peace agreements
167. The Panel regards the quick disbursal of development assistance as essential to addressing the pressing social and economic needs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, it also recommends that disbursal should be contingent on the adherence of the Government to the peace agreements it has signed with Rwanda and Uganda, its commitment to democratization and its progress in curbing the illegal exploitation of its natural resources.
Reform of natural resource sectors
168. Reforms of the mining and the forestry sectors should include the review of all concessions and contracts signed during both wars. The resolution adopted during the inter-Congolese dialogue, establishing a special commission to examine the validity of economic and financial agreements, could serve as the framework for this process. On the basis of the Panel's findings, this could also target all informal agreements on the awarding of concessions and the implementation of contracts. The international community, including the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and UNDP, could collaborate closely with this commission and provide the support necessary for it to carry out its work in a thorough and objective manner. This could include expert advice and technical assistance, part of which could be focused on raising long-term international investment for the rehabilitation of the mining and forestry sectors and sustainable revenue generation.
Financial and technical measures
169. In the event of non-compliance with the recently signed agreements, and the continuing illicit and illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Panel recommends that a series of measures be taken against the concerned parties.
Role of Governments
170. The Governments of the countries where the individuals, companies and financial institutions that are systematically and actively involved in these activities are based should assume their share of the responsibility. The Governments have the power to regulate and sanction those individuals and entities. They could adapt their national legislation as needed to effectively investigate and prosecute the illegal traffickers. In addition, the OECD Guidelines offer a mechanism for bringing violations of them by business enterprises to the attention of home Governments, that is, Governments of the countries where the enterprises are registered. Governments with jurisdiction over these enterprises are complicit themselves when they do not take remedial measures.
Reducing official development assistance
171. The Panel's exchange of views with bilateral and multilateral organizations, as well as a review of applicable agreements such as the Cotonou Convention, indicates that there is ample justification for donors to respond to a Security Council resolution - which might be necessary - which would propose certain reductions in official aid to promote peace and good governance.
172. Measures should also be aimed at making aid disbursements to Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe conditional on their compliance with the relevant agreements in the Lusaka peace process and on verifiable measures taken to halt the illegal and illicit exploitation of the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo which can help to achieve multiple objectives. Non-compliance would automatically trigger a review and reduction of assistance programmes for those countries. It should be stipulated that reductions of aid disbursements are to be applied to institutional budget support, stabilization lending or project lending and not sector-specific allocations.
173. Implementation would proceed in three stages:
(a) A brief grace period to permit the verification of the compliance of all the parties to the conflict;
(b) An initial period when aid disbursements are reduced by a modest percentage if the countries involved have not met withdrawal targets;
(c) A subsequent period during which the aid is proportionately reduced at regular increases at regular intervals unless troop withdrawals and compliance with the peace agreements meet the required standards.
Restrictions on business enterprises and individuals
174. The Panel has compiled an extensive list of business enterprises and individuals whose involvement in the commercial activities of the three elite networks active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is well documented. At this time it is however, focusing its recommendations regarding restrictive measures on only a small number of enterprises (annex I) and individuals (annex II) - many of them cited in this report - as a result of the wealth of information and documentary evidence gathered on them by the Panel.
175. By contributing to the revenues of the elite networks, directly or indirectly, those companies and individuals contribute to the ongoing conflict and to human rights abuses. More specifically, those business enterprises are in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Therefore, the Panel recommends that the Security Council consider imposing certain restrictions on a selected number of business enterprises and individuals involved in criminal and illicit exploitation that are identified in this report. The list emphasizes the implication of foreign enterprises as well as nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the economic exploitation.
176. There could be a short grace period of four to five months before the restrictions set out below are applied, during which the targeted entities and individuals would have the opportunity to prove that they have ceased all involvement in the exploitation activities. The restrictive measures could include:
(a) Travel bans on selected individuals identified by the Panel;
(b) Freezing of the personal assets of persons involved in illegal exploitation;
(c) Barring selected companies and individuals from accessing banking facilities and other financial institutions and from receiving funding or establishing a partnership or other commercial relations with international financial institutions.
Adherence of business enterprises to the OECD Guidelines
177. The Panel has drafted another list of business enterprises (annex III) which, in the view of the Panel, are in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Countries which are signatories to those Guidelines and other countries are morally obliged to ensure that their business enterprises adhere to and act on the Guidelines.
178. The OECD Guidelines outline a procedure for bringing violations of the Guidelines to the attention of the Governments of the States where the business enterprises are registered. Home Governments have the obligation to ensure that enterprises in their jurisdiction do not abuse principles of conduct that they have adopted as a matter of law. They are complicit when they do not take remedial measures. The monitoring body, as described below, will contribute to implementing these procedures by verifying and updating its list of business enterprises in violation of the OECD Guidelines and transmitting evidence of those violations to the OECD National Contact Points in the home Governments of the enterprises.
Transit trade and regional organizations
179. To promote post-conflict peace-building programmes, the Panel recommends that the international community support the following confidence-building measures:
(a) Encouraging the East African Community, composed of Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, to include Rwanda and Burundi in its membership;
(b) Helping to re-establish historical and legal trading patterns, for example by reopening the Northern Corridor transit route to legal trade among the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya;
(c) Assisting the relevant African regional trade organizations to improve their customs and trade monitoring mechanisms. These might include juxtaposed border control facilities, harmonization of controls to promote the system and use of certificates of origin and destination, and assistance in developing national legislation for monitoring financial flows related to trade;
(d) Improving air traffic control services in the Great Lakes region. The Technical Cooperation Programme of ICAO can provide assistance to States in the region that need to improve their air traffic control service.
Regulating commodity trade from conflict areas
180. Specialized industry organizations such as the Tantalum Niobium International Study Centre, the International Gold Council and the International Coffee Federation could be requested, in cooperation with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to monitor trade in commodities from conflict areas. This would result in a reliable body of data that includes information relating to the evacuation of commodities, transit routes through neighbouring countries and information on end-users and their operations. The data produced could be the basis of industry policing of those individuals, companies and financial institutions that trade in commodities from conflict areas. The data could also serve in the event that a moratorium is called for on the illegal trade in commodities originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, such as coltan.
Kimberley Process
181. All Member States where trade in rough diamonds is being carried out should join the Kimberley Process. Universal participation will make the Kimberley Process a more effective instrument.
182. Diamond-producing countries should apply internal controls from extraction to exportation. Consideration should be given to establishing a set of internationally agreed upon standards for this process. A specialized enforcement organization within each member country needs to be formed that has the authority, knowledge and specialized training necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process.
183. A permanently staffed secretariat should be created with the responsibility of coordinating the implementation of the Kimberley Process.
Protecting timber and forestry products
184. The Panel recommends that Member States actively support the efforts by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations at both the international and regional levels to halt illegal logging and to develop an international definition of "conflict timber".
Trade in endangered species
185. Trade involving endangered species of wild fauna and flora taken from protected areas of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is another activity in which elements of the criminal networks are engaged. Member States are asked to support the Task Force established under the Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora by (a) strengthening their national legislation to reinforce the powers of investigation and prosecution of the Task Force's personnel and (b) ensuring that their National Bureaus, established under that Agreement, intensify their investigations into the criminal traffic in endangered species of wild animals and plants as outlined by CITES.
Monitoring process
186. There is a need for a monitoring process that continues to scrutinize the situation in the Great Lakes region to ensure that exploitation activities are significantly curbed. A monitoring body, which the Security Council may consider establishing, could report to the Security Council on a regular basis on its findings, including recommendations about further action to halt activities that violate the Council's decisions. The Panel's expertise could be helpful in this regard.
187. The monitoring body could report to the Security Council on any State or company that might be involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The monitoring body could recommend to the Council that major multilateral institutions and bilateral donors review and reduce the financial assistance programmes of any State found to be involved in these illegal activities. It could recommend to the Council that any company found to be implicated in the illegal economic exploitation be added to or kept on the list of those enterprises subject to financial and travel restrictions. In addition, the monitoring body could collaborate closely with national officials, including from the Central Bank of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Office des douanes et accises (customs administration) and the Direction générale des recettes administratives, judiciaires, domaniales et de participations (revenue administration), the Ministry of Mines and Hyrdocarbons, the State mining enterprises and private mining and mineral companies, in order to update information on how capacity-building and reforms are affecting the exploitation activities. In carrying out these tasks, the monitoring body could coordinate with the international financial institutions, the African Union, and the Economic Commission for Africa.
188. The Panel would also recommend that the monitoring body, with the adequate expertise and resources, track the following:
(a) Possible reductions in the level of illegal exploitation;
(b) The implementation of possible travel bans and the freezing of assets;
(c) Ongoing investigations into the illicit commerce in minerals, timber and endangered species of fauna and flora. The monitoring body could also collaborate further on some of these investigations;
(d) The sectors of the economy that have been affected by the exploitation activities;
(e) The impact on the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region;
(f) The reduction in violent conflict and the maintenance of civil order in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the viability of local administrations and institutions related to the mandate of the monitoring body which might be adopted by the Council.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem
Chairman
(Signed) Jim Freedman
(Signed) Mel Holt
(Signed) Bruno Schiemsky
(Signed) Moustapha Tall
(Signed) Patrick Smith
Annex I. Companies on which the Panel recommends the placing of financial restrictions
 |
Name |
Address |
Business |
Principal officers |
Comment |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
AHMAD DIAMOND CORPORATION |
ANTWERP BELGIUM |
Diamond trading |
Mr. AHMAD Imad |
|
| 2 |
ASA DIAM |
ANTWERP BELGIUM |
Diamond trading |
Mr. AHMAD Ali Said |
|
| 3 |
BUKAVU AVIATION TRANSPORT |
DRC |
Airline company |
Mr. BOUT Victor |
|
| 4 |
BUSINESS AIR SERVICE |
DRC |
Airline company |
Mr. BOUT Victor |
|
| 5 |
COMIEX-CONGO |
KINSHASA DRC |
|
Mr. KABASELE TSHINEU Frederic |
|
| 6 |
CONGO HOLDING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY |
DRC |
Trading and exploitation of natural resources DRC |
Mr. Félicien RUCHACHA BIKUMU
Mrs. Gertrude KITEMBO |
|
| 7 |
CONMET |
UGANDA and DRC |
Coltan trading |
Mr. Salim Saleh
Mr. and Mrs. PISKUNOV |
|
| 8 |
COSLEG |
ZIM and DRC |
Joint-venture COMIEX and OSLEG |
Mr. KABASELE TSHINEU Frédéric
ZVINAVASHE Gava MUSUNGWA Vitalis |
|
| 9 |
EAGLE WINGS RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL |
PO BOX 6355
Kigali, Rwanda |
Exploitation coltan from the DRC |
Mr. Alfred RWIGEMA
Mr. Anthony MARINUS
Mr. Ronald S. SMIERCIAK |
Tel: +250.51.17.25 |
| 10 |
ENTERPRISE GENERAL MALTA FORREST |
|
Exploitation Cobalt, Copper in DRC |
Mr. George FORREST |
|
| 11 |
EXACO |
|
Exploitation Cobalt, Copper in the DRC |
|
|
| 12 |
GREAT LAKES GENERAL TRADE |
BP 3737
KIGALI, RWANDA |
Mineral trading |
Maj Dan MUNYUZA
Mr. E. GATETE
Mr. Steven K. AKHIMANZI |
Tel/Fax: +250.78.792 |
| 13 |
GREAT LAKES METALS |
Kigali, Rwanda |
Mineral trading |
|
|
| 14 |
GROUP GEORGE FORREST |
|
Exploitation Cobalt and Copper |
Mr. George FORREST |
|
| 15 |
MINERALS BUSINESS COMPANY |
Boulevard Du 30 Juin, Immeuble ex-SCIBE, Kinshasa, DRC |
Mineral trading |
Mr. KABASELE TSHINEU Frederic
Lt General ZVINAVASHE Gava Musungwa Vitalis
Mr. Charles DAURAMANZI |
|
| 16 |
OKAPI AIR
ODESSA AIR |
Uganda |
Airline company |
Mr. BOUT Victor |
|
| 17 |
OPERATION SOVEREIGN LEGITIMACY (OSLEG) Pvt Ltd |
Harare, Zimbabwe |
Commercial interests ZIM in DRC |
Lt General ZVINAVASHE Gava Musungwa Vitalis |
|
| 18 |
ORYX NATURAL RESOURCES |
DRC |
Diamond exploitation in the DRC |
Mr. AL-SHANFARI Thamer Said Ahmed |
|
| 19 |
RWANDA ALLIED PARTNERS |
Kigali, Rwanda |
Mineral trading |
Mr. Hadji OMARI
Mr. Simba MANASE |
|
| 20 |
RWANDA METALS |
Kigali, Rwanda |
Mineral trading |
|
|
| 21 |
SARACEN UGANDA Ltd |
Uganda |
Security Company |
Lt General (Rtd) Salim Saleh
Mr. Heckie HORN |
|
| 22 |
SIERRA GEM DIAMONDS |
ANTWERP
BELGIUM |
Diamond trading |
Mr. AHMAD Said Ali
Mr. AHMAD Hassan
Mr. AHMAD Nazem |
|
| 23 |
TANDAN GROUP |
SOUTH AFRICA |
Holding |
Mr. Niko SHEFER |
|
| 24 |
THORNTREE INDUSTRIES (Pvt) Ltd |
|
Provides capital to MBC |
Mr. Niko SHEFER |
|
| 25 |
TREMALT Ltd |
|
Exploitation cobalt and copper |
Mr. John Arnold BREDENKAMP |
|
| 26 |
TRINITY INVESTMENT GROUP |
DRC and UGANDA |
Exploitation resources and tax fraud |
Mr. NGOLA Sam
General KAZINI |
|
| 27 |
TRIPLE A DIAMONDS |
ANTWERP BELGIUM |
Diamond trading |
Mr. AHMAD Moussa Ahmad
Mr. AHMAD Ahmad Ali |
|
| 28 |
TRISTAR |
Kigali, Rwanda |
Holding FPR |
|
|
| 29 |
VICTORIA GROUP |
DRC and UGANDA |
Exploitation resources and tax fraud |
Lt General (Rtd) Salim Saleh
Mr. KHANAFER Nahim |
|
Annex II. Persons for whom the Panel recommends a travel ban and financial restrictions
|
Last name |
First name |
Alias |
Date of birth |
Passport number |
Designation |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
AHMAD |
Ali Said |
|
01.03.1959 |
|
Businessman |
| 2 |
AHMAD |
Ahmad Ali |
|
01.01.1929 |
|
|
| 3 |
AHMAD |
Imad |
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 4 |
AHMAD |
Said Ali |
|
09.04.1935 |
|
Businessman |
| 5 |
AHMAD |
Hassan |
|
21.05.1957 |
|
Businessman |
| 6 |
AHMAD |
Moussa Ahmad |
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
AHMAD |
Nazem |
|
05.01.1965 |
|
Businessman |
| 8 |
AKHIMANZA |
Steven K. |
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 9 |
AL-SHANFARI |
Thamer Said Ahmed |
|
03.01.1968 |
00000999 (Oman) |
Chairman & Managing Director ORYX Group and ORYX Natural Resources |
| 10 |
BOUT |
Victor Anatoljevitch |
BUTT, BONT, BUTTE, BOUTOV, SERGITOV Vitali |
13.01.1967
or
??? |
21N0532664
29N0006765
21N0532664
21N0557148
44N3570350 |
Dealer and transporter of weapons and minerals |
| 11 |
BREDENKAMP |
John Arnold |
|
11.08.1940 |
|
Businessman |
| 12 |
BURUNDI |
|
|
|
|
Colonel UPDF |
| 13 |
DAURAMANZI |
Charles |
|
|
|
Shareholder MBC |
| 14 |
ENGOLA |
Sam |
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 15 |
FORREST |
George A. |
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 16 |
GATETE |
Edward |
|
|
|
Officer RPA; Operation Congo Desk |
| 17 |
HORN |
Heckie |
|
|
|
Manager Saracen Uganda Ltd |
| 18 |
KABANDA |
Emmanuel |
|
|
|
Officer RPA; Operation Congo Desk |
| 19 |
KABAREBE |
James |
|
|
|
Chief of Staff RPA; Former Chief of Staff DRC; in charge of Congo Desk |
| 20 |
KABASELE TSHINEU |
Frédéric |
|
|
|
Manager COMIEX, representative of COSLEG |
| 21 |
KALUME NUMBI |
Denis |
|
|
|
General, shareholder SENGA SENGA |
| 22 |
KARIM |
Peter |
|
|
|
Officer UPDF |
| 23 |
KATUMBA MWANKE |
Augustin |
|
|
|
Minister of Presidency, DRC |
| 24 |
KAZADI NYEMBWE |
Didier |
|
|
|
Director Agence National de Renseignements DRC |
| 25 |
KAZINI |
James |
|
|
|
Chief of Staff, Maj. General UPDF |
| 26 |
KHANAFER |
Nahim |
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 27 |
KIBASSA MALIBA |
|
|
|
|
Politician, former Minister of Mines, shareholder SENGA SENGA |
| 28 |
KITEMBO |
Gertrude |
|
|
|
Businesswoman |
| 29 |
KONGOLO |
Mwenze |
|
|
|
Minister DRC, shareholder SENGA SENGA |
| 30 |
MANASE SIMBA |
|
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 31 |
MAWAPANGA |
Mwana Nanga |
|
|
|
Ambassador DRC in Harare |
| 32 |
MAYOMBO |
Nobel |
|
|
|
Chief Military Intelligence (CMI) in Uganda |
| 33 |
MNANGAGWA DAMBUDZO |
Emmerson |
|
|
|
Speaker of Parliament ZIMBABWE |
|
34 |
MOYO |
Mike |
|
|
|
Wing Commander ZDF |
| 35 |
MOYO |
Sibusio |
|
|
|
Bd-Gen (Rtd) ZDF |
| 36 |
MUAMBA NOZI |
Richard |
MWAMBA NOZY |
|
|
Congolese diamond trader; Counterfeiter |
| 37 |
MUNYUZA |
Dan |
|
|
|
Colonel RPA; In charge of security DRC (96-98) |
| 38 |
MWENZE KONGOLO |
|
|
|
|
Minister National Security, DRC |
| 39 |
NUMBI KALUME |
Denis |
|
|
|
Minister of Planning and Reconstruction DRC |
| 40 |
NZIZA |
Jack |
|
|
|
Officer RPA |
| 41 |
OKOTO LOLAKOMBE |
Jean-Charles |
|
|
|
PDG MIBA |
| 42 |
OMARI HADJI |
|
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 43 |
OTAFIRE KAHINDA |
|
|
|
|
Colonel UPDF |
| 44 |
MARINUS |
Anthony |
|
|
|
Manager Eagle Wings |
| 45 |
PISKUNOV |
Anatol |
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 46 |
PISKUNOVA |
Valentina |
|
|
|
Businesswoman |
| 47 |
RUCHACHA BIKUMU |
Felicien |
|
|
|
Businessman |
| 48 |
RUPRAH |
Sanjivan |
Samir Nasr
Medhi Khan |
09.08.1966 |
D-001829-00 |
Businessman |
| 49 |
RWIGEMA |
Alfred |
|
|
|
Manager Eagle Wings |
| 50 |
SALIM SALEH |
|
AKANDWANAHO Caleb |
|
|
Lt General (Ret.) UPDF |
| 51 |
SHEFER |
Niko |
Nico |
25.12.1950 |
7616225 (Israel) 6651101 (Israel) |
Businessman |
| 52 |
SMIERCIAK |
Ronald S. |
|
|
|
Manager Eagle Wings |
| 53 |
YUMBA MONGA |
|
|
|
|
Manager GECAMINES |
| 54 |
ZVINAVASHE GAVA MUSUNGWA |
Vitalis |
|
|
|
Lt General ZDF, Rep. of COSLEG, shareholder MBC |
Annex III. Business enterprises considered by the Panel to be in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
Annex IV. Countries visited and representatives of Governments and organizations interviewed
The Panel wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Government officials, diplomats, United Nations agencies, donor institutions, non-governmental organizations, civil society groups, journalists, commercial operators and others with whom it met and who have assisted in making possible the present report.
The Panel also wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the Panel would like to thank the United Nations Office in Burundi and the UNDP offices in Bangui, Brazzaville, Bujumbura, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa, Pretoria and Yaounde for their assistance and support.
Austria
International organizations
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
Belgium
Government officials
Inter-Ministerial Ad Hoc Working Group on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
State representatives
European Union Commission
Others
Arslanian Frères
International Peace Information Service
Sibeca
Sogem mineral trading company (division of Umicore)
Tantalum Niobium International Study Center
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Burundi
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mines
Minister of Finance
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of France
International organizations
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi
Others
Affimet
ASYST mineral trading company
Comptoir minier des exploitations du Burundi (COMEBU)
HAMZA mineral trading company
Central African Republic
Government officials
Ministry of Economy
Ministry of Equipment, Transport and Settlement
Ministry of Finance and Budget
Minister of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics
Minister of Trade and Industry
Department of Customs
State representatives
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of France
European Union
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
ASECNA
UNHCR
UNDP
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Land Affairs, Environment and Tourism
Minister of Planning and Reconstruction
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vice-Minister of Mines
Deputy Chief of Staff of the FAC
Governor of the Central Bank
Governor of Equateur Province
Governor of Katanga
Governor of Mbuji Mayi
Vice-Governor, in charge of the Economy, Finance and Development, Equateur Province
Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification
Comité interministériel de "Small Scale Mining"
Générale des carrières et des mines (Gécamines)
Office national des transports
Régie des voies aériennes
Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA)
State representatives
Ambassador of Angola
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Canada
Ambassador of Germany
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
Belgian Consul
Embassy of Denmark
Embassy of France
European Union
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
FAO
GTZ
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
World Bank
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
MLC
President
Secretary-General
RCD-Goma
Vice President
Commissioner of the Interior
Governor of Kalemie
Department of Mines and Energy
Vice-Governor of Kisangani
Customs officials
RCD-K/ML
Second Vice-President
Minister of Interior
Acting Chief of Staff for the APC
Governor of Bunia
Governor of Ituri Province
Mayor of Butembo
Others
Action contre la faim
ADETE
Agro Action Allemand
Associazione per la Cooperazione Internationale e l'Ainto Umanitario
Anglican Church
Ashanti Goldfield
Association africaine des droits de l'homme (ASADHO)
Banque internationale de commerce
BEP Productique (BEPROD)
Conseil african et malgache pour l'enseignement supérieur (CAMES)
Caritas
Centre d'information et d'animation missionnaire (CIAM)
Centre d'études national sur le développement populaire (CENADEP)
Centre de formation, recherches en conservation forestière
Centre national d'appui au développement et à la participation populaire (CENADEP)
Church of Christ of the Congo
Comité provincial des diamantaires (CPD)
Commissions diocésaines Justice et Paix (CDPJ)
Conseil apostolique des laïques catholiques au Congo (CALCC)
Conference on Central Africa Moist Forest Ecosystems participants
Confédération de petites et moyennes enterprises du Congo (COPEMECO)
COSLEG (joint venture of COMIEX Congo and OSLEG)
Dara Forêt
Exploitation forestière, sciérie raffinage de la papaine (ENRA)
Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC - Kinshasa, Kisangani, Mbandaka, Beni, Goma, Gémena, Bukavu)
Fédération nationale des parents d'élèves du Congo (FNPEC)
Fédération des ONG laïques à vocation économique au Congo (FOLECO)
Forces novatrices pour l'union et la solidarité (FONUS)
Groupe de recherches et d'échanges technologiques (in Kabinda)
Groupe Lotus
Groupe musulman des droits de l'homme
GST (Gécamines labour union)
Héritiers de la justice
International Human Rights Law Group
International Rescue Committee
Inter Press Service (IPS)
JAMS
Journalistes en danger
Justice et Paix
Ligue des avocats pour les droits de l'homme
Kababankola Mining Company
Kotinne Plantation
Jardin botanique d'Eala
Maintenance, Assistance, Technique and Design
Mayi-Mayi representatives
Médecins sans Frontières (of Belgium and France)
Mennonite Church
Mouvement nationale congolais Lumumba (MNCL)
Mouvement des pionniers de l'indépendence
Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR)
National Commission of Experts on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
National Congolese Railway Society (SNCC)
National Council of Development NGOs (CNONGD)
Nganga Plantation
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
Organisation concertée des ecologistes et amis de la nature (OCEAN)
OKIMO
Oxfam
Parti démocrate et social chrétien (PDSC )
Parti lumumbiste unifié (PALU)
Pharmakina
Pole Institute
Promotion de la femme rural (PROFER)
Programme d'appui aux femmes victimes des conflits et des catastrophes
Radio Okapi
Regional Committee of Development NGOs (CRONGD)
Religious community representatives
Radio Télé Debout Kasaï (RTDK)
Save the Children
Sengamines
Shenimed Coltan Comptoir
Syndicat des exploitants alluvionnaires du diamant (APLOKA)
SOCEBO
Société civile du Congo (SOCICO)
Société de renforcement de communauté de base (SERACOB)
Solidarités
TOFEN-CONGO
TRAFCO Freight Company
UDPS representatives
UPDF Sector Commander in Bunia
UPDF Battalion Commander in Butembo
UPDF Colonel Peter Karim
Union des banques congolaises
Voix du handicape pour les droits de l'homme (VHDH)
Wildlife Conservation Society
France
Government officials
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Others
Air France Cargo
Germany
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Others
H. C. Starck
Karl-Heinz Albers Mining and Minerals Processing
Kenya
Government officials
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Kenya Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
High Commissioner of the Republic of South Africa
Ambassador of Rwanda
High Commissioner of Uganda
Belgian Ministry of Defence
German Embassy
Belgian Parliamentary Inquiry Commission
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Democratic Republic of the Congo National Parks representatives
Institut congolais de conservation de la nature (Ministry of Environment, Democratic Republic of the Congo)
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
Special Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
World Customs Organization
World Wildlife Fund
Others
Association of Cargo Airliners
Congolese Commission of National Experts
Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund
International Crisis Group
Kababankola Mining Company/Tremalt Ltd.
Kencargo
Lusaka Agreement Task Force
Martin Air
Oryx Natural Resources
Oxfam
World Vision
Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Environment
Ministry of Transport
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Union
International organizations
UNDP
Rwanda
Government officials
Special Envoy of the President for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi
Office of the President of Rwanda
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Customs Commission
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
European Union
International organizations
MONUC
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
President of RCD-Goma
Eagle Wings Resources
SDV Transintra
SOGERMI mineral trading company
South Africa
Government officials
Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs
Department of Foreign Affairs
Department of Defence
Department of Home Affairs
Department of Minerals and Energy
Financial Intelligence Centre
National Intelligence Agency
National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
National Prosecuting Authority
National Treasury
Secretariat for Safety and Security
South African Diamond Board
South African Police
South African Revenue Service
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United States
High Commission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Others
Banro
Bateman Minerals and Metals
Centre for the Study of Economic Crime
Cobalt Metals Company
Compliance Institute
De Beers Group
DiamondWorks
Executive Outcomes
Fluxmans Attorneys
Grove Family Trust
International Institute of Security Studies
Kimberley Process Secretariat
Money Laundering Forum
Overseas Security Services
PricewaterhouseCoopers Forensic Services Division
Rand Afrikaans University
Rand Merchant Bank
SaferAfrica
STK Consulting
Tandan Holdings
Trans Hex
Ware Associates
University of South Africa at Pretoria
University of Witwatersrand/South African Institute for International Affairs
Uganda
Government officials
First Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Chief of Staff of UPDF
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry
Bank of Uganda
Department of Geological Survey and Mines
Uganda Bureau of Statistics
Uganda Civil Aviation Authority
Uganda Coffee Development Authority
Uganda Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Denmark
Ambassador of France
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
Head of the Delegation of the European Union
International organizations
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
Amnesty International
Judicial Commission of Inquiry
Saracen Uganda Ltd.
Uganda Debt Network
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
United States of America
Government officials
Department of Justice
State representatives
Belgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, Security Council members and other Member States
International organizations
International Monetary Fund
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
UNDP
Forum on Forests
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
World Bank
Others
Human Rights Watch
Oxfam
Winston Strawn and Partners
Zambia
Others
Non-governmental organizations
Zimbabwe
Government officials
Ministry of Mines
State representatives
British High Commission
Others
Renaissance Bank
Dozer Parts
Annex V. Abbreviations
ADB African Development Bank
ANC Armée nationale congolaise (army of RCD-G movement)
APC Armée patriotique congolaise (army of the RCD-ML rebel group
ASECNA Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
coltan columbo-tantalite
COMIEX Compagnie mixte d'import-export
COSLEG COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
FAC Forces armées congolaises
ex-FAR former Forces armées rwandaises
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gécamines Générale des carrières et des mines
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschafte für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Government agency for technical cooperation)
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
KMC Kababankola Mining Company
MIBA Société minière de Bakwanga
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OKIMO Office des Mines de Kilo-Moto
OSLEG Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy)
RCD-Congo Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (newly formed rebel group made up of MLC and RCD-Goma dissidents)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
RCD-K/ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie - Mouvement de libération, initially based in Kisangani, now headquartered in Bunia
RCD-N Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-National
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
SADC Southern African Development Community
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SOMIGL Société minière des Grands Lacs
SOCEBO Société congolaise d'exploitation du bois
UDPS Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UPDF Uganda People's Defence Forces
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WCO World Customs Organization
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces
